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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
secti \ *• -.a- ;, •• • •••• v.-ai 11 om a final order denying Petitioner's 
Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Third 
Judicial District Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
•1. Whether it is an abuse of discretion iui a ti;ai , (ui; ;.iu . , • , 
« ettlement agreement is signed, but prior to the 
ciiti> 01 ihe Decree, and :^:._•: .*v\ n . the matter, a party discovers, and brings to the 
attention of the court, new evidence pertaining to marital assets n| ihe partus, v hen' fin; p i o p n h 
e ;-^ -v : ^ equitably divide the marital assets and upon which the Decree 
was based. i"b* '••.'•>>./ is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from.. 
judgment under Ulah R, l'iv. I" iiOi^'i .mil IJ< i<>t.>iiNni<itinn v., ill not hr disturbed .ibsml .111 
abi ise of discretion Birch v. Birch, 771 i'.^u ^li-ty 1 L ; / ^Luh Ct. App. 1989), 
2 . . Whether it is an. abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to set ask;, a Jecree 
of Divorce based upon a ^np I.ilium iiiiai v m, siynal uniln 1 in .t.ilsc of fail due to the non-
moving party's overt failure to disclose relevant information prior to the preparation and signing 
of the Stipulation. Parties are bound by their stipulations unless relieved 111 J 11 11 o 1 1 eo 1111 
winch in ilw \nmvt In si'l usiilr ,i stipulation entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause. 
Klein v. Klein, 544 P >: I '2 <' ,'tah 1975); First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel 
andAssocs . ,600P.2d52. a 1.. / 9) 
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3. Whether it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to set aside a Decree 
of Divorce pursuant to Rule 60(b) when the Decree was entered based upon a Stipulation, after 
one of the parties to the Stipulation repudiates the agreement and communicates the repudiation 
to her counsel and to the Respondent's counsel prior to the entry of the Decree. A trial court has 
discretion in determining whether a movant has shown "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect," and the appellate court will reverse the ruling of the trial court only upon a 
showing of abuse of discretion. Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998)(citing Utah R. 
Civ. P. 60(b); Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984)). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the denial of Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside a Decree of Divorce 
that was entered pursuant to a Stipulation of the parties. Based upon the information available to 
her at the time, Petitioner entered into a Stipulation. Petitioner discovered after she signed the 
stipulation that Respondent had not in fact fully disclosed all assets, and that Respondent had 
likely hidden assets during the parties' marriage. Petitioner learned the information regarding 
hidden marital assets subsequent to the date she signed the Stipulation, but prior to the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce. Petitioner sought other legal advice and based upon that advice informed 
her attorney that she repudiated her agreement to the Stipulation. Petitioner's attorney informed 
Respondent's attorney that Petitioner repudiated the agreement. Other legal counsel informed 
Respondent's attorney that Petitioner repudiated her agreement. A copy of a letter from 
Petitioner to her attorney in which she indicated that she repudiated the agreement was sent to 
Respondent's attorney. Subsequent to learning that Petitioner repudiated her consent to the 
Stipulation, Respondent's attorney nevertheless caused the Stipulation, the Decree of Divorce, 
and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be filed with the District Court and failed to 
advise the court of his knowledge of Petitioner's repudiation. The Decree was entered on the 19th 
day of May, 1998. On the 1st day of June, 1998, Petitioner moved the Court to set aside the 
Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law claiming that she had been 
provided wrong or incomplete information by Respondent and her counsel, and upon her 
discovery of the new information she had immediately repudiated her agreement. In support of 
her Motion to Set Aside, Petitioner offered an Affidavit by a person with actual knowledge that 
Respondent had acquired assets during the marriage that he had hidden from Petitioner and failed 
to disclose during the pending divorce litigation. The trial court denied Petitioner's Motion to 
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Set Aside Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Void Stipulation. 
This is Petitioner's appeal from the final judgment of the trial court denying Petitioner's Rule 
60(b) Motion. 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant in this matter, Mrs. Stratton, was Petitioner below. 
2. On June 10, 1988 the parties to this action were married and filed for divorce on 
February 6, 1996. (Rec. 01-07). Prior to the parties' marriage, they entered into an antenuptial 
agreement. (Rec. 75-80). 
3. On March 11, 1996, Mrs. Stratton served upon Mr. Stratton Petitioner's first set of 
interrogatories and request for production of documents. (Rec. 37). On April 15, 1996, Mr. 
Stratton served upon Mrs. Stratton Respondent's first set of interrogatories and request for 
production of documents. (Rec. 38). 
4. On July 9, 1996, pursuant to a temporary Order entered by the Court Mr. Stratton, 
Appellee in this matter and Respondent below, was ordered to pay $400.00 per month as and for 
temporary alimony. (Rec. 27; 39-41). 
5. On September 9, 1996, Mrs. Stratton filed a Motion to Compel Mr. Stratton to 
answer the outstanding discovery that was served on him in March, 1996. (Rec. 42). A hearing 
on the Motion to Compel was held November 29, 1996 at which, Mr. Stratton's default was 
entered and the Motion to Compel granted. (Rec. 55; 58-59). 
6. On December 13,1996, Mr. Stratton served his answers to Mrs. Stratton's first set 
of interrogatories and request for production of documents. (Rec. 56). 
7. On April 30, 1997, Daniel Darger entered his appearance as attorney of record for 
Mrs. Stratton. (Rec. 60). 
8. On October 23, 1997 Mrs. Stratton's motion to void and annul antenuptial 
agreement and award suit money (Rec. 128-129) was heard by the Commissioner . The 
Commissioner recommended, and it became the order of the court, that the issue of the validity 
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of the antenuptial was a trial issue. The Commissioner reserved the issue for the trial court. 
(Rec. 140; 144-145). 
9. On December 4, 1997, Mrs. Stratton served her second request for production of 
documents on Mr. Stratton. (Rec. 143). 
10. On March 1, 1998, Mr. Stratton served his answers to Mrs. Stratton's second 
request for production of documents. (Rec. 153). 
11. As of March, 1998, Mr. Stratton was in arrears for temporary alimony in the 
amount of $1,400.00. (Rec. 156-157). Accordingly, counsel for Mrs. Stratton filed a Motion to 
Enforce Temporary Order of Support (Rec. 154-155) which was scheduled for hearing before the 
Commissioner on May 28,1998. (Rec. 158-159). 
12. On April 30, 1998, Mrs. Stratton executed a Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement. (Rec. 160-163). On May 1, 1998, Mr. Stratton executed the same document. (Rec. 
163). 
13. Shortly after signing the Stipulation, Mrs. Stratton learned that Mr. Stratton had 
not made full disclosure of all assets acquired during the marriage. (Rec. 234). 
14. On May 13, 1998, Mrs. Stratton sought advice from different counsel, Richard 
Leedy. (Rec. 217). On that same day Mrs. Stratton spoke to Mr. Darger and indicated to him 
that she did not want the stipulation to be effective and repudiated her agreement thereto. (Rec. 
217; 222; 234-235). On May 13, 1998, Mrs. Stratton prepared and was delivered to Mr. Darger 
with a copy to Mr. Falk, counsel for Mr. Stratton, a written notice of her repudiation of the 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. (Rec. 206). 
15. Based upon Mrs. Stratton's expressed desire to repudiate the stipulation, Mr. 
Leedy placed a telephone call to Mr. Falk to so inform him on May 13, 1998. (Rec. 217-218). 
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Mr. Darger, based upon Mrs. Stratton's expressed desire to repudiate the stipulation, also called 
Mr. Falk to inform him that Mrs. Stratton had repudiated her stipulation and sent a follow up 
letter. (Rec. 222-223). 
16. On May 14, 1998, Mr. Stratton's counsel filed with the District Court the Notice 
to Submit for Decision (Rec. 172-173), the Affidavit of Jurisdiction and Grounds (Rec. 169-171), 
and a copy of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement (Rec. 164-168).. 
17. On May 18, 1998, a Withdrawal of Counsel for Petitioner was filed with the 
District Court. (Rec. 174-175). 
18. On May 19, 1998, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Rec. 176-179) 
and the Decree of Divorce (Rec. 180-182) were signed by the District Court Judge and filed and 
entered by the District Court. 
19. On May 21, 1998, Mrs. Stratton's new counsel entered his appearance. (Rec. 
183-184). 
20. On May 28, 1998, the Commissioner recommended that the hearing on 
Petitioner's Motion to Enforce Temporary Order be continued without date. (Rec. 185). 
21. On June 1, 1998, Mrs. Stratton filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (Rec. 186-240). Mrs. Stratton also filed her sworn affidavit stating that subsequent to the 
signing of the Stipulation she learned that substantial properties that were acquired during the 
parties' marriage had been hidden from her and not disclosed prior to the signing of the 
Stipulation. (Rec. 197; 234). Mrs. Stratton moved that the Decree be set aside because its entry 
was based upon the parties' Stipulation that Mrs. Stratton had repudiated on May 13, 1998. 
(Rec. 193). 
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22. Mr. Stratton's counsel responded to Mrs. Stratton's Motion denying that Mr. 
Darger had indicated that Mrs. Stratton had repudiated the Stipulation. (Rec. 252). Counsel 
further alleged that Mrs. Stratton's allegations as to hidden assets were "vague and nebulous" 
and without specificity. (Rec. 255). 
23. On July 10, 1998, counsel for both parties argued the Rule 60(b) Motion before 
the Honorable Judge Frank Noel. (Rec. 516). No transcript resulted from that hearing despite 
the fact that the courtroom was equipped with video equipment. (Addendum 2, Certificate that 
no transcript exists). Oral argument was cut short due to a bomb threat at the courthouse. Mrs. 
Stratton was given no opportunity to present rebuttal evidence or argument. (Rec. 535). The 
Court, after being notified to evacuate the building, did not continue the matter, but took the 
matter under advisement. (Rec. 516). 
24. On July 17, 1998, the Court issued a Minute Entry ruling denying Mrs. Stratton's 
Rule 60(b) Motion. (Rec. 517-519). The Court indicated that Mrs. Stratton's allegations as to 
Mr. Stratton's failure to disclose additional information at the time Mrs. Stratton signed the 
Stipulation was insufficient because she failed to disclose the identify of the informant who 
provided her with the information and failed to adequately identify the nature of the information. 
(Rec. 517-518). 
25. Based upon the Court's Minute Entry ruling, on August 4, 1998 Mrs. Stratton 
filed the Affidavit of Sherry Epperson who stated under oath that she had actual knowledge that 
Mr. Stratton received marital property consisting of parcels of real property that had not been 
disclosed to Mrs. Stratton and that Mr. Stratton also had an executive bonus plan that accrued 
during the marriage that had a substantial cash value. (Rec. 526-528). Mrs. Stratton filed a 
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Motion for Rehearing concurrently with the affidavit of Ms. Epperson. In support of Mrs. 
Stratton motion for a rehearing on her Rule (b) Motion to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Rec. 531-537), Mrs. Stratton stated that the reason 
she had not earlier disclosed the identity of the witness was that Ms. Epperson had a fear of 
retaliation from Mr. Stratton and her other former business partners. (Rec. 533). 
26. Mr. Stratton responded (Rec. 547-550) but did not dispute the information set 
forth in the Affidavit of Sherry Epperson, arguing instead that Mrs. Stratton failed to carry her 
burden under Rule 60(b) showing that by due diligence she could not have discovered the 
information in time to move for a new trial and failed to show that there would be a different 
result. (Rec. 554-557) 
27. On September 30, 1998, Judge Noel issued a Minute Entry ruling denying Mrs. 
Stratton's Motion for a Rehearing and instructing Mr. Stratton's counsel to resubmit the prepared 
Order. (Rec. 561). 
28. On November 13, 1998, Judge Noel signed the Order Denying Motion to Set 
Aside Decree, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Void Stipulation. (Rec. 563-
565). 
29. On December 9,1998, Mrs. Stratton filed a Notice of Appeal. (Rec. 575-576). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 59; 60 (Addendum 3) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the Decree of Divorce 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) based upon newly discovered evidence. 
Rule 60(b) sets forth that a judgment can be set aside "upon motion and upon such terms as are 
just" when a party discovers new evidence that by due diligence could not have been discovered 
in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b). Rule 59(b) allows a court to grant a motion for 
new trial when a party discovers new, material evidence that could not have been discovered 
through "reasonable diligence" in time to present at trial. No trial occurred in this matter because 
of the execution of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. Mrs. Stratton justifiably 
relied upon Mr. Stratton's responses to her formal discovery requests in the divorce litigation. 
Mrs. Stratton entered into the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement based upon that 
knowledge and information. Mrs. Stratton had no reason to know and did not know that Ms. 
Epperson had any additional information until Ms. Epperson volunteered the information to Mrs. 
Stratton. Upon learning that certain marital property had not been disclosed by Mr. Stratton, 
Mrs. Stratton immediately repudiated her agreement to the Stipulation in writing as the 
Stipulation did not deal with all of the marital property. Mrs. Stratton acted in a reasonably 
timely fashion in bringing the newly discovered evidence to the attention of the court. 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the Decree of Divorce based 
upon the parties' stipulation to a distribution of marital property when the court was promptly 
advised of newly discovered evidence showing that the information upon which the stipulation 
was based was incomplete or inaccurate. The court has discretion to set aside the stipulation and 
the Decree upon which it was based when information is presented in a timely fashion and where 
setting aside the order would lead to a different result. A stipulation to resolve a lawsuit 
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constitutes a waiver of rights. In order to have an enforceable stipulation the waiver of rights 
must be a knowing waiver. Mrs. Stratton would not have signed the Stipulation as prepared had 
she known that Mr. Stratton had acquired parcels of real property and a large retirement account 
during the marriage that he failed to disclose. The result to Mrs. Stratton would be different had 
she possessed complete and accurate knowledge and information regarding the nature and extent 
of all of the marital assets. 
The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment, and its 
determination will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. It was an abuse 
of the trial court's discretion to refuse to set aside the Decree of Divorce because Mrs. Stratton 
had not initially identified the person from whom she learned that assets had not been disclosed 
and/or had not sufficiently identified the secreted marital assets, and further abused its discretion 
in refusing a rehearing of the issue when a sworn affidavit was filed with the court which 
disclosed the identify of the informant and specific information regarding the secreted marital 
assets. 
A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes an error in law that is detrimental to a 
party. In this case, the trial court erroneously concluded that the stipulation upon which the 
Decree was based could not be overturned because of an antenuptial agreement. The validity and 
applicability of the antenuptial agreement was an issue pending before the court. It was an error 
in law to conclude that the antenuptial agreement would preclude an equitable division of the 
marital property newly discovered by Mrs. Stratton because Mrs. Stratton had waived her claims 
regarding the validity and applicability of the antenuptial agreement in the Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement. Although the law favors stipulations and sets forth that parties 
should be bound by their agreements unless relieved therefrom by the court, in certain cases a 
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court has the ability to set aside a stipulation that was voluntarily entered. A trial court can set 
aside a stipulation on a legal or equitable basis. Where Mr. Stratton failed to disclose the 
existence of the property acquired during the marriage the court should equitably void the 
Stipulation and allow Mrs. Stratton to present her evidence. 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the Decree of Divorce 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The 
Stipulation that was signed by the parties was based upon disclosures made by Mr. Stratton 
during the divorce proceedings. Mrs. Stratton signed a Stipulation and consented to the entry of 
the Decree based upon that Stipulation. Subsequent to her signing, but prior to the entry of the 
Decree, Mrs. Stratton was surprised to learn that Mr. Stratton had not in fact disclosed all assets 
that were acquired during the parties' marriage, and the assets that were not disclosed were 
substantial. Mrs. Stratton, individually and through others, immediately communicated with Mr. 
Stratton's counsel to indicate that she repudiated her agreement to the Stipulation, and when the 
Decree had been entered, immediately moved the Court to grant her Rule 60(b) relief therefrom. 
It was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to set aside the Decree of Divorce to allow 
Mrs. Stratton to assert the newly discovered evidence based upon mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO SET 
ASIDE THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
A. Petitioner Timely Presented the New Evidence to the Trial Court 
1. In order to prevail on a Motion for Relief pursuant to RRule 60(b)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the moving party must show that there has been newly discovered 
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evidence that by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59, and that such evidence was of sufficient substance that there would be a 
reasonable likelihood of a different result. Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(2); Kettner v. Snow, 375 
P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 1962). 
2. The reference to a ten (10) day time limitation within Rule 60(b)(2) requires a 
party to show why, through due diligence, she could not discover the evidence in time to move 
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. Rule 59 sets forth that a motion for a new trial must be 
presented to the court within 10 days of the trial, and the moving party must show why, through 
reasonable diligence, she could not discover the evidence in time to present the evidence at trial. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b); 59. There was no trial in this matter thus the ten (10) day 
limitation inapplicable. 
3. Rule 60(b) provides that a party may be relieved from a final judgment, order or 
proceeding under such terms as are just if, within a reasonable time, a party so moves the court. 
The "within a reasonable time" limitation pertains to reasons based upon mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect as well as reasons based upon newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b). 
4. Mrs. Stratton sought relief within a reasonable time. Mrs. Stratton included 
within her Rule 60(b) Motion the allegation that subsequent to the signing of the Stipulation she 
discovered that Mr. Stratton failed to disclose to her all the assets acquired during the marriage. 
(Rec. 197-199). She stated that she became informed of secreted marital property after April 30, 
1998 when she signed the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. She claims she 
communicated her repudiation of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement on May 13, 
1998 to her counsel who advised Mr. Stratton's counsel, and also that another attorney from 
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whom she had sought legal advice, had, at her request, telephoned Mr. Stratton's counsel on May 
13, 1998 to inform him of Mrs. Stratton's repudiation of the Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement. Despite this actual notice, on May 14, 1998 Mr. Stratton's counsel rushed to file the 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement with the court, who, on May 19, 1998, without 
notice of Mrs. Stratton's repudiation, signed the Decree of Divorce which incorporated and 
approved the terms of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement signed by the parties. 
Mrs. Stratton then filed her Rule 60(b) Motion with the court on June 1, 1998. 
5. Mrs. Stratton exercised due diligence to discover marital assets during the 
litigation of the divorce. Mrs. Stratton's Motion to void and annul antenuptial agreement filed 
October 23, 1997 (Rec. 128-129) was based upon her discovery that Mr. Stratton had not fully 
disclosed all of his assets at that time. Mrs. Stratton conducted formal discovery in the divorce 
proceedings. Mr. Stratton did not reveal to Mrs. Stratton through formal discovery that during 
their marriage he had acquired an interest in an executive bonus plan and parcels of real property. 
Based upon the answers to discovery provided under oath by Mr. Stratton, Mrs. Stratton signed 
the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. Upon learning shortly thereafter that other 
assets had in fact been acquired, Mrs. Stratton immediately repudiated the Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement. 
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B. Petitioner Properly Set Forth that She Discovered New Evidence that Would 
Affect the Result 
1. Newly discovered evidence is sufficient grounds for the trial court to set 
aside a judgment 
6. The moving party has the burden to show that the newly discovered evidence was 
of sufficient substance that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a different result. Utah R. 
Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(2); Kettner, 375 P.2d at 30. Mrs. Stratton proffered to the trial court that she 
discovered new evidence in the form of a witness who informed her that she had information that 
Mr. Stratton acquired assets during the marriage that were not disclosed to Mrs. Stratton. (Rec. 
555). Mr. Stratton argued that because Mrs. Stratton failed to identify the witness prior to the 
initial hearing, the trial court should not consider such information. (Rec. 555-556). No 
transcript of the hearing is available. A bomb threat to the courthouse cut the proceedings short 
and rather than continuing the matter for completion of arguments the court took the matter 
under advisement. 
7. The minute entry from the trial court denying Mrs. Stratton's Motion for 
Rehearing does not set forth any findings of fact. (Rec. 561) The trial court could have based its 
decision to deny the motion on Mr. Stratton's argument that failure to identify the witness during 
the Motion to Set Aside proceedings was fatal to Mrs. Stratton's claim. (Rec. 517-518). The 
trial court determined that because the informant and the information had not been adequately 
identified by Mrs. Stratton, there was insufficient basis to overturn the Stipulation. 
8. Mrs. Stratton filed with the court the sworn affidavit of the informant that 
specifically identified the property, (Rec. 526-528), along with a Motion for Rehearing (Rec. 
531-537), setting forth the reasons why the identity of the informant had not been disclosed 
earlier. 
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9. A trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from 
judgment under Rule 60(b), and its determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). A trial court's discretion 
is entitled to a presumption of validity. Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). In order to overcome the presumption of validity, and to show that the trial court abused 
its discretion, the moving party must show that the trial court misunderstood or misapplied the 
law and that misunderstanding or misapphcation resulted in substantial and prejudicial error, or 
that a serious inequity has resulted so as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Pope 
v. Pope. 589 P.2d 752, 753 (Utah 1978)). 
10. All assets acquired by the parties during marriage must be considered by the trial 
court when making an equitable distribution. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 837 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). The right to receive money in the future is an economic resource that is subject to 
equitable distribution by a divorce court. Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 
1982). In Woodward, the Utah Supreme Court set forth that retirement benefits that are accrued 
during a marriage are marital property and "the court must at least consider those benefits in 
making an equitable distribution of the marital assets." Id. Mrs. Stratton stated that during the 
marriage, Mr. Stratton acquired an interest in an executive bonus plan funded through an 
insurance company. (Rec. 527). Mrs. Stratton set forth that during the marriage, Mr. Stratton 
acquired parcels of real property. (Rec. 527). The Stipulation of the parties does not reflect any 
division, or even consideration, of the executive bonus plan or the real property in making a 
distribution of the marital assets. The Findings of Fact do not reflect that such property exists. 
Mr. Stratton did not deny that during the marriage he acquired an interest in an executive bonus 
plan and parcels of real property. The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to apply the 
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law as set forth in Woodward and Jefferies by failing to consider all the marital assets acquired 
during the marriage prior to affirming the division of the marital property. The failure of the trial 
court to consider all marital property acquired during the marriage in making an equitable 
distribution constitutes an abuse of discretion because it was a misapplication of the law. See 
Rahsam, 742 P.2d at 124. 
11. The refusal of the trial court to consider the newly discovered evidence that Mr. 
Stratton failed to disclose assets acquired during the parties' marriage caused substantial 
prejudice to Mrs. Stratton. See id. According to Sherry Epperson, Mr. Stratton acquired parcels 
of real property and an interest in an executive bonus plan during the marriage that were not 
disclosed to Mrs. Stratton prior to her signing the Stipulation. (Rec. 526-527). Although Ms. 
Epperson did not know the exact value of Mr. Stratton's interest in the executive bonus plan, she 
believed that it was substantial, and likely worth at least as much as hers. (Rec. 527). Ms. 
Epperson provided documentation showing that her executive bonus plan was worth in excess of 
$85,000.00 (Rec. 529-530). The trial court failed to take into consideration the executive bonus 
plan in making a property distribution and failed to take into consideration the parcels of real 
property acquired by Mr. Stratton that were not disclosed to Mrs. Stratton or the trial court. 
Depending on the actual value of the executive bonus plan, and the proportion thereof that was 
acquired during the marriage, Mrs. Stratton would be entitled to a proportional share of that plan. 
See Woodward, 656 P.2d at 432. The value of the real property could be substantial as well. 
The failure of the trial court to consider all marital property thus causing substantial prejudice to 
Mrs. Stratton constitutes an abuse of discretion and the judgment below should be reversed. 
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2. The Stipulation was voidable 
12. The Decree of Divorce was entered on the basis of a Stipulation and Property 
Agreement signed by the parties. Rule 60(b) requires the movant to show that she would be 
entitled to a different result than the provided by the Decree. Mrs. Stratton, therefore, had the 
burden below to show that the evidence that she discovered would be sufficient to allow her to 
prevail on a motion to void the Stipulation. 
13. Parties are bound by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the court, 
which has the power to set aside a stipulation entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause. 
Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 1975); First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. 
Zundel and Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979). When a decree is based upon a property 
settlement that was negotiated by the parties and sanctioned by the court, equity must take the 
parties' agreement into consideration in an analysis of whether or not to set aside the stipulation. 
A trial court can set aside a stipulation on a legal or equitable basis. Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 
170, 171 (Utah 1985) (citing Klein, 544 at 476. Equity is not available to reinstate rights that 
have voluntarily been contracted away simply because one has come to regret the bargain made. 
Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah Ct. App. 1989¥citing Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 
1250 (Utah 1980)). 
14. Mrs. Stratton did not move to void the Stipulation of the parties simply because 
she regretted the bargain made. Mrs. Stratton moved to void the Stipulation on the basis that she 
signed the Stipulation based upon certain information that turned out to be incorrect or 
incomplete. To support her motion, Mrs. Stratton provided the trial court with specific 
information as to the lack of disclosure by Mr. Stratton. A stipulation to a property settlement in 
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a divorce action must be treated as a contract that protects and waives certain rights and 
obligations. In order to have a valid waiver there must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, 
a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. Soter's Inc., v. Deseret Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993). Mrs. Stratton had an existing right, 
benefit, or advantage in the form of a marital interest in the parcels of real property and the 
executive bonus plan acquired by Mr. Stratton during the parties' marriage. Mrs. Stratton, 
however, did not have knowledge of the existence of that interest, nor an intention to relinquish 
that interest at the time she signed the Stipulation. As set forth in Soter's. the central question to 
most waiver cases is the intent to relinquish a known right. Id. at 940. Mrs. Stratton put forth to 
the trial court evidence that at the time she signed the Stipulation she did not know of the 
property obtained by Mr. Stratton during the marriage. Mrs. Stratton's allegation that she did not 
know of the property raises the issue of whether she could have intended to relinquish her rights 
to that property. 
15. The question of intentional relinquishment of a right is fact dependent. Id. The 
trial court considered Mrs. Stratton's allegations as to hidden assets but determined that because 
she "failed to indicate who provided her with this information or where she obtained the 
information, or even what the nature of the information is[,] [and] there are no specifics 
whatsoever as to what assets were hidden, what fraud was committed, etc., . . . that that is not 
sufficient basis to overturn the settlement agreement." (Rec. 517-518; 567). Subsequent to the 
trial court's denial of her Motion, Mrs. Stratton sought a rehearing and submitted the Affidavit of 
Ms. Epperson who indicated that she had the information from her own knowledge, that the 
information was that Mr. Stratton had acquired certain assets during the marriage that were not 
disclosed along with the nature of those assets:~real property and an executive bonus plan. Mrs. 
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Stratton's motion for rehearing was based upon the information provided to the trial court and 
the failure of the trial court to address the issue that complete disclosure of marital property had 
not been made prior to the signing of the Stipulation. The trial court abused its discretion by 
refusing the rehearing and determining that the failure to disclose material information prior to 
the signing of the Stipulation was not a sufficient basis upon which to overturn a settlement 
agreement. 
3. The Antenuptial agreement did not preclude the trial court from 
distributing the property that was discovered 
16. Mrs. Stratton would be entitled to a different outcome if the Decree were set 
aside. Mrs. Stratton had a pending issue before the trial court regarding the validity of the 
antenuptial agreement. The antenuptial, even if valid, was not applicable to assets acquired by 
the parties during the marriage. It was not established that the antenuptial would be applicable to 
newly discovered property acquired by Mr. Stratton during the marriage. 
17. The trial court recognized that Mrs. Stratton had previously asserted that the 
antenuptial was voidable on the basis that Mr. Stratton had failed to disclose material information 
at the time the antenuptial was signed. (Rec. 517). The trial court made the specific finding that 
Mrs. Stratton must have contemplated waiving her assertion of the validity of the antenuptial at 
the time she signed the Stipulation. Mrs. Stratton contemplated that she was giving up her right 
to dispute the validity of the antenuptial by virtue of her signing the Stipulation. However, at the 
time Mrs. Stratton signed the Stipulation, she was unaware of the existence of the other property 
acquired by Mr. Stratton during their marriage. 
18. The antenuptial executed by the parties set forth that certain property was separate 
property of that party and subsequent to the marriage, would remain separate property of that 
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party. The antenuptial does not disclose as part of Mr. Stratton's property, a retirement plan or 
parcels of real property. These assets were acquired during the marriage and would not be 
subject to the provisions of the antenuptial unless Mr. Stratton could show that they are directly 
traceable to his separate property. (Rec. 286-287). There was no judicial determination that the 
assets acquired during the marriage were directly traceable to Mr. Stratton's separate property. 
The reason there was no judicial determination is that Mr. Stratton failed to disclose to Mrs. 
Stratton that he acquired those properties. At the time Mrs. Stratton executed the Stipulation, she 
understood that she had a right to dispute the validity of the antenuptial. The Commissioner 
specifically reserved the issue of the validity of the antenuptial for the trial court. 
C. Petitioner Alleged Sufficient Grounds to Set Aside the Decree on the Basis of 
Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect 
19. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the Decree of Divorce 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The 
Stipulation that was signed by the parties was based upon the disclosures made by Mr. Stratton 
during the divorce proceedings. Mrs. Stratton signed a Stipulation and consented to the entry of 
the Decree. Subsequent to her signing, but prior to the entry of the Decree, Mrs. Stratton learned 
that Mr. Stratton had not in fact disclosed all assets that were acquired during the parties' 
marriage, and the assets that were not disclosed were substantial. Mrs. Stratton, individually and 
through others, communicated with Mr. Stratton's counsel to indicate that she repudiated her 
agreement to the Stipulation. Subsequent to receiving information that Mrs. Stratton repudiated 
her consent, Mr. Stratton's counsel proceeded to submit to the court for signature the Stipulation, 
the Decree, and the Findings of Fact. It was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to 
set aside the Decree of Divorce to allow Mrs. Stratton to assert the newly discovered evidence in 
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setting aside the Stipulation. The Decree based upon the Stipulation, the agreement thereto 
having been withdrawn, was not then based upon consent because the consent of Mrs. Stratton 
had been withdrawn prior to the entry of the Decree. As such, it was an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to refuse to set aside the Decree to allow Mrs. Stratton to assert her defenses to the 
Stipulation. 
CONCLUSION 
The denial of Mrs. Stratton's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and to Void Stipulation should be reversed. The trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to set aside the Decree when presented with evidence that Mr. Stratton had 
failed to disclose assets acquired during the marriage. The evidence presented to the trial court 
was sufficient to allow Mrs. Stratton to obtain a different result than that contained in the Decree. 
Mrs. Stratton alleged sufficient grounds to void the Stipulation on the grounds that there had not 
been full disclosure and as such, she could not have knowingly waived her rights. 
The trial court abused its discretion by erroneously concluding that the Stipulation could 
not be overturned because of the applicability of the antenuptial agreement. The erroneous 
conclusion of law resulted in substantial prejudice to Mrs. Stratton. 
The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the Decree of Divorce that 
was entered on the basis of a Stipulation that was signed without full disclosure and was 
repudiated prior to the entry of the Decree. The trial court had the equitable power to set aside 
the Decree and allow Mrs. Stratton to move to void the stipulation. 
Based upon the foregoing, Mrs. Stratton respectfully requests the decision of the trial 
court be reversed and this matter reinstated in the Third District Court to allow her to proceed on 
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her motion to void the Stipulation and to void the antenuptial, and to allow this matter to proceed 
to trial. 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1, Order on Motion to Set Aside Decree, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
to Void Stipulation 
Frank J. Falk (6538) 
Attorney for Respondent 
869 East 4500 South #222 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(801) 265-1538 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
DIVISION 1, STATE OF UTAH 
VICKIL. STRATTON, 
Petitioner, ORDER ON MOTION 
vs. TO SET ASD3E DECREE, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
DAVID E. STRATTON, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND TO VOID STIPULATION 
Respondent 
Case No. 964900538 DA 
Judge Frank Noel 
Commissioner Lisa A. Jones 
THIS MATTER came regularly before the Court on Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside 
Decree, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and To Void Stipulation. Petitioner was 
personally present and represented by her attorney of record, Glen M. Richman. The Defendant 
was personally present and represented by his attorney of record, Frank J. Falk. The Court read 
the parties pleadings on file with the Court and heard arguments of counsel for each of the 
parties. The Court having been fully apprised of the premises herein, it now makes the following 
TOSKSF 
,i 0 0 5 6 3 
FINDINGS 
1. The Petitioner first attacked the Antenuptial Agreement on the basis that 
Respondent failed to disclose information at the time the Antenuptial Agreement was entered 
into. 
2. The Court notes that prior to the Stipulation in this case the Motion was made by 
Petitioner to Set Aside the Antenuptial Agreement on the same grounds, i.e., that the Respondent 
had failed to disclose material information. 
3. The Court finds that Petitioner's claims with respect to the Antenuptial 
Agreement and the alleged failure to disclose material information must have been contemplated 
by the Petitioner at the time the Stipulation to settle this matter was entered in to. 
4. Petitioner next claims that new evidence has come to her attentions suggesting 
that the Respondent has committed fraud and misrepresentation and has failed to disclose certain 
additional information that she did not know about at the time she entered into the Stipulation. 
5. Petitioner has failed to indicate who provided her with this information. 
6. Petitioner has failed to indicate where she obtained the information. 
7. Petitioner has failed to indicate even what the nature of the information is. 
8. Petitioner failed to provide the Court with any specifics whatsoever as to what 
assets were hidden or what fraud was committed. 
9. The Court is of the opinion that there is not sufficient basis upon which to 
overturn the settlement agreement. 
Based on the foregoing Findings the Court now enters the following 
ORDER 000564 
Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside Decree, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
To Void Stipulation is denied. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 
Honorable 
Third Judicil 
Approved as to form: 
^fZ///tt t#? j&*Jtow0?c~-
Glen M. Richman 
Attorney for Petitioner 
ORDER 
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Exhibit 2, Certificate that no Transcript Exists 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VICKIL. STRATTON, 
Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 981822-CA 
DAVID E. STRATTON, Priority 15 
Appellee. 
CERTIFICATE THAT TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT EXIST 
On appeal from the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Court Judge Presiding 
Counsel for Appellee: Counsel for Appellant: 
Frank J. Falk, Esq. Glen M. Richman, Esq. (2752) 
869 East 4500 South, #222 Bart J. Johnsen, Esq. (7068) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 RICHMAN & RICHMAN, L.L.C. 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
1 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
Bunny Neuenschwander, being first duly sworn under her oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
Affiant is over the age of 18 years and the matters stated herein are of Affiant's personal 
knowledge, except those items stated upon information and belief, and as to those items, 
Affiant believes them to be true. 
Affiant has searched the records of the Third District Court and has determined that no 
transcript or video exists for the hearing before the Honorable Frank G. Noel on the 10th 
day of July, 1998. 
DATED this oc day of February, 1999. 
§ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of February, 1999. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
y Commission Expires: 
Vt MOflflffPMUft 
fTMKftfGM 
CERTMCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 1999, a true and correct copies of the 
foregoing CERTIFICATE THAT TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT EXIST was mailed, first class 
postage pre-paid to: 
Frank J. Falk, Esq. 
869 East 4500 South, #222 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
LeoraLoy 
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Exhibit 3. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59; Rule 60 
709 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 59 
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the 
affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
Rale 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursu-
ant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, shall be in 
accordance with these rules, and the right to trial by jury may 
be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner 
provided in Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another ade-
quate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory 
relief in cases where it is appropriate. The court may order a 
speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and 
may advance it on the calendar. 
Role 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court 
otherwise directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), 
judgment upon the verdict of a jury shall be forthwith signed 
by the clerk and filed. If there is a special verdict or a general 
verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned 
by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the 
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the 
clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdi-
vision (a) hereof and Subdivision (bXl) of Rule 55, all judg-
ments shall be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions 
and judgment docket A judgment is complete and shall be 
deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien 
on real property, when the same is signed and filed as herein 
above provided. The clerk shall immediately make a notation 
of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment 
docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. A copy of the 
signed judgment shall be promptly served by the party pre-
paring it in the manner provided in Rule 5. The time for filing 
a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement of this 
provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a 
verdict or decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, 
judgment may nevertheless be rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by con-
fession is authorized by statute, the party seeking the same 
must file with the clerk of the court in which the judgment is 
to be entered a statement, verified by the defendant, to the 
following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to 
become due, it shall concisely state the claim and that tht. sum 
confessed therefor is justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of 
securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must 
state concisely the claim and that the sum confessed therefor 
does not exceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified 
sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and 
enter in the judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the 
amount confessed, with costs of entry, if any. 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment. 
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judgment may be 
satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any or all of the judgment 
debtors, by the owner thereof, or by the attorney of record of 
the judgment creditor where no assignment of the judgment 
has been filed and such attorney executes such satisfaction 
within eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the 
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly acknowl-
edged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by acknowledgment of 
such satisfaction signed by the owner or attorney and entered 
on the docket of the judgment in the county where first 
docketed, with the date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. 
Every satisfaction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or 
more of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid 
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming them. 
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judgment shall 
have been fully paid and not satisfied of record, or when the 
satisfaction of judgment shall have been lost, the court in 
which such judgment was recovered may, upon motion and 
satisfactory proof, authorize the attorney of the judgment 
creditor to satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring 
the same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered upon 
the docket. 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction of judg-
ment, duly executed and acknowledged, the clerk shall file the 
same with the papers in the case, and enter it on the register 
of actions. He shall also enter a brief statement of the 
substance thereof, including the amount paid, on the margin 
of the judgment docket, with the date of filing of such satis-
faction. 
(d) Effect of satis faction. When a judgment shall have been 
satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any judgment debtor, and 
such satisfaction entered upon the docket by the clerk, such 
judgment shall, to the extent of such satisfaction, be dis-
charged and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, 
if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, 
such execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of such 
partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to collect only 
the residue thereof, or to collect only from the judgment 
debtors remaining liable thereon. 
(e) Filing transcript of satis faction in other counties. When 
any satisfaction of a judgment shall have been entered on the 
judgment docket of the county where such judgment was first 
docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate 
by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with the 
clerk of the district court in any other county where the 
judgment may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry 
in the judgment docket shall be made by the clerk of such 
court; and such entry shall have the same effect as in the 
county where the same was originally entered. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has 
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of 
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclu-
sions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion 
by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of 
the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or 
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to 
them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as 
a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not 
have guarded against. 
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(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party mak-
ing the application, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion, A motion for a new trial shall be served 
not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new 
trial is made under Subdivision (aXD, (2), (3), or (4), it shall be 
supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is 
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. 
The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the 
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be ex-
tended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either 
by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written 
stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry 
of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new 
trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial 
on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds 
therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter 
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days 
after entry of the judgment. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, or-
ders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at 
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and 
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discov-
ered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as 
are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discov-
ered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mis-
representation or other misconduct of an adverse party, (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, re-
leased, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule 
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding 
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evi-
dence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in 
anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, 
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears 
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment. 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or other pro-
ceedings to enforce a judgment may issue immediately upon 
the entry of the judgment, unless the court in its discretion 
and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as 
are proper, otherwise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its 
discretion and on such conditions for the security of the 
adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the execution 
of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the 
disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a 
judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief 
from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a 
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed 
verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amend-
ment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant 
to Rule 52(b). 
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken 
from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, 
or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may 
suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the 
pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as it considers 
proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party. 
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken the appel-
lant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless 
such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these rules. The 
bond may be given at or after the time of filing the notice of 
appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is 
approved by the court. 
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. When an 
appeal is taken by the United States, the state of Utah, or an 
officer or agency of either, or by direction of any department of 
either, and the operation or enforcement of the judgment is 
stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be required 
from the appellant. 
(f) Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where the defendant 
is adjudged guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlawfully 
holding public office, civil or military, within this state, the 
execution of the judgment shall not be stayed on an appeal. 
(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The provisions in 
this rule do not limit any power of an appellate court or of a 
judge or justice thereof to stay proceedings or to suspend, 
modify, restore, or grant an injunction, or extraordinary relief 
or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo or 
the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered. 
(h) Stay of judgment upon multiple claims. When a court 
has ordered a final judgment on some but not all of the claims 
presented in the action under the conditions stated in Rule 
54(b), the court may stay enforcement of that judgment until 
the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may 
prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the 
benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is 
entered. 
(i) Form of supersedeas bond; deposit in lieu of bond; waiver 
of bond; jurisdiction over sureties to be set forth m undertak-
ing. 
( D A supersedeas bond given under Subdivision (d) may be 
either a commercial bond having a surety authorized to 
transact insurance business under Title 31 A, or a personal 
bond having one or more sureties who are residents of Utah 
